Whilst the ignorant sections of the media continue to attack President Mubarak and accuse the regime of heavy handed crack downs, the conveniently neglect to point out the only group the crack down is targeting is the OUTLAWED Muslim brother Hood.
It is almost like these journalists are living on another planet. The ignorance of these sections of the media to write such a perverted ill informed pieces!!
One piece by the Washington Post, in its attack of Mubarak it does mention in passing the Muslim brother hood is outlawed.
They then proceed to engage in rhetoric and rubbish damnation of mubarak under the pretence of human rights, it is nothing short of "engaging in a full frontal assault of the Mubarak regime".
May be the Washington Post should have a look at what has been posted on the Muslim Brotherhood web site today.
In 2009 the Muslim Brotherhood's Supreme Guide Mohammed Mehdi Akef voluntarily stepped aside -- the first time a top leader in the movement had voluntarily resigned before reaching death's door. His message, as Michele Dunne of the Carnegie Endowment describes it, was that ‘we old guys need to step aside -- I'm going to set an example.' This month Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak, Akef's counterpart in the ruling establishment, hinted he would run for a third term in office next year, extending his three decade rule.
Akef's resignation was the high note in a pitch that Islamist groups have repeatedly made: that they are more internally democratic and dynamic than their secular counterparts. It's a cultivated image that glosses over a deeply flawed system, one that can be just as autocratic and hostile to new ideas. But it is giving Islamist groups a competitive edge, especially in attracting and retaining a new generation of talented members.
Hezbollah and the Muslim Brotherhood are the sharpest examples: they recruit young, smart entry-level members, sort them according to interest and expertise, and, in some cases, allow them to rise the ranks, with an emphasis on ideological purity and a populist touch. Through an internal political Darwinism, the process produced leaders who've have been able to outsmart and outmaneuver their secular rivals. It has also energized the lower ranks, where young volunteers then help run rallies, canvass for elections, or take up arms.
‘An educated, politically interested young person from some secondary Egyptian city would certainly be attracted to the Muslim Brotherhood over the NDP,' said Steven Cook of the Council on Foreign Relations. ‘It is clear that is where the political dynamism is.'
I tested the idea with Ramy Raoof, a 23-year-old digital activist from Egypt's Al Minya province. I asked whether he and his contemporaries -- middle class recent college graduates -- were attracted to the Muslim Brotherhood's mix of ideology, social services, and opportunity for engagement. He steered away from the movement and into an NGO on human rights. But his friends were attracted by the Muslim Brotherhood's pitch.
"The Brotherhood is getting more young people to join them by offering different things," Raoof told me. Those things include college fees, cheap textbooks, and money to defray the cost of getting married.
"But they'll also say, ‘Come join us and we will make you general manager of this, or head counselor of that. Some sexy title,'" Raoof explained. "It's part of how they attract people. Some people are looking forward to being leaders, and the Brotherhood use these kind of opportunities to get people to join. "
In Raoof and others there is evidence that political Islam is winning the war for talent, attracting a greater share of the young, smart, and politically inclined than the secular establishment. It's partly because for decades, Islamist groups have been the most viable opposition, harnessing public frustration and outlasting secular leftists who've been stamped out by the regime. As the primary opposition, Islamists have been driven by necessity to attract and make room for entry-level activists, who in turn boost their claims of popular legitimacy.
April 6 and Mohammed El Baradei's National Association for Change are adopting some of the same grassroots tactics and attracting some of the young political talent. But the Muslim Brotherhood has a long lead and an enormous base -- part of the reason Baradei has partnered with them to get his movement off the ground.
To say that political Islam may be winning the war for talent requires a working definition of ‘talent.' I don't mean the MBAs and Ivy League graduates, who'd likely find a place in the ruling establishment (in part because they often come from it). I am thinking of the Ramy Raoofs, the dynamic twenty-somethings with ideas and energy but no discernable ‘wastah,' or connections into the power elite. They are the majority by number, and their hearts and minds are in play. Where they land says much about the momentum and future direction of the Arab polity. Here, attracting ‘talent' means attracting focused, capable support.
Hezbollah has built itself on that kind of ‘talent.' While it filters doctors into its hospitals and teachers into its schools, in key roles it values street smarts, battle smarts, and emotional intelligence over formal qualifications. Alastair Crooke, a former British diplomat considered close to Hezbollah, says that during the 2006 war their units were led by men in their early 20s, making decisive moves on a largely autonomous basis. Crooke says they are selecting for young people who were ‘very knowledgeable and very self-effacing. It's not like ticking the box -- have you taken this course, have you had this degree? It's the ability to cast a spell, to cast a web, to have people follow you.'
But Lebanon, as usual, is a complicated case study. Within its sectarian system young talents generally stick to their own religious party -- Shiites to Hezbollah or Amal, Maronite Christians to the Lebanese Forces or Phalange, etc. Their bonds of allegiance may be stronger, because they are bonds of faith and ideology. But there is a limit to individual participation in that talent can rise, but the top spot is often held for scions of a political family. There are alternative outlets for activist energy, like civil society groups that promote culture, environmentalism, and the movement for a secular Lebanon. But when it comes to the major political parties, young upstarts are largely locked out.
One way Islamist groups have tapped in to that base is by creating diverse ways to participate; you can be a cleric in Hezbollah or attend one of its rallies in a miniskirt; you can lead your local branch of the Muslim Brotherhood or just collect signatures; you can join the volunteer police corps run by Hamas. That kind of easy-to-reach participation cements support and helps new recruits take the first step into their circle. But once in the system, can fresh faces really rise into leadership? That's where the system gets stuck.
In terms of real meritocracy, Islamists political movements have many of the same deficiencies as the secular establishment: they are largely autocratic, manipulated through patronage and often intolerant of dissent. 'There's still a complaint that the younger generation don't feel they have a chance,' said Carnegie's Michele Dunne. '‘[It can be] the leader for life phenomenon, undemocratic internal procedures, gerentocracies with old men holding onto their seats forever.'
Yet Islamists maintain a perceived meritocracy, along with a real opportunity to participate at the low- and mid-level. That gives them a strategic advantage in attracting and retaining many of the region's brightest and most dedicated minds. Having that human capital makes them better equipped and more resilient as the political forces of the Arab world collide.
When I read the article, i found it totally bewildering and beyond comprehension as to how any arm of the media could directly or indirectly sanction the support in any form of the MB. Such as a stance is the epitome of ignorance and only serves to promote and encourage this OUTLAWED sect and undermine the efforts and strategy of President Mubarak.
President Mubarak is under no Illusion that the stability of the country has an overriding priority to any perceived notions of heavy handedness or abuse of special security powers.
The article by the Washington post can be equated to them calling “for all governments not to interfere with outlawed bikie gangs”.
Does the Post understand Outlawed means just that “Outlawed”.
Iit is irrelevant what you represent, if you are outlawed it means you are outlawed, society will not allow you to exist in that form.
By all accounts I would say President Mubarak is been very kind and generous to the MB.
He has not adopted the tact of Mexico in dealing with the OUTLAWED “drug cartel” and resort to a full on military assault. Still the MB continues to ridicule legislation and by pass laws by running as independents and then voting as a block “muslim brotherhood”.
In addition they insist on the use of religious slogans, “Islam is the solution” despite specific laws and court rulings affirming it is unlawful.
Further they shun the law and they continue to exist as an organisation that is unlawful and banned. THEY ARE OUTLAWED; they should not exist at all.
If Mubarak was been heavy handed as he has been accused “he should string them all up in public for the world to follow suit”.
The Washington Post has been pushing this theme for a long time, and not one mention of the history or the threats posed by the MB to Egypt and the entire world..
I wonder who is running the show at the Washington post.
Who is scratching whose back in the post?
Why is the post wilfully omitting and ignoring known facts and that it is the MB that is been targeted by the Mubarak Regime?
The below article appeared in the Washington post http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2010/11/05/AR2010110507140.html
Abducted in Egypt
Saturday, November 6, 2010
LAST APRIL, Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak disregarded appeals from the Obama administration and violated his own public promises by renewing the "emergency law" that for decades has allowed security forces to prevent public demonstrations, break up political meetings, close media outlets and arrest opposition activists without charge. When the administration protested, Egyptian officials assured it that the law henceforth would be applied only in terrorism and drug cases. The White House cited that pledge in a recent summary of its human rights accomplishments.
Now, with a parliamentary election approaching, the regime's political repression has grown more rather than less severe. Hundreds of political activists from the banned Muslim Brotherhood party have been arrested; critical television talk shows and newspaper columns have been canceled; student leaders have been rounded up. In a number of recent cases, peaceful political activists, including those supporting secular democratic movements, have been "disappeared": abducted and held for days by the secret police and sometimes beaten or tortured, before being released on roads outside Cairo.
As he pledged, Mr. Mubarak has done all this without use of the emergency law. Instead the regime has begun acting entirely outside the rule of law. The young activists who have been beaten or kidnapped have no recourse; there is no case to contest, and they are unable even to identify those who assault them.
This slide by Egypt toward the police-state methods usually associated with Syria or Sudan is a problem for the United States as well as for Egyptians. Mr. Mubarak is 82 and ailing; by rejecting political liberalization and choosing deeper repression, he is paving the way for even worse developments once he dies and the struggle to succeed him begins. Mr. Mubarak's successors will need to acquire political legitimacy; if they cannnot do so through democracy they probably will resort to nationalism and anti-Americanism.
Fortunately there are signs that the White House is at last waking up to its Egypt problem. This week a number of senior officials met with an ad hoc group of foreign policy experts who have been trying to call attention to the need for a change in U.S. policy. Some good ideas were discussed, such as a strong presidential statement about the conduct of the elections or the dispatch of a special envoy to Cairo. A new U.S. ambassador committed to political change, rather than apologizing for the regime, would help. What's most important is to make clear to Mr. Mubarak that the administration expects some immediate, even if incremental, changes. An end to the beating and abduction of peaceful activists would be a good place to start